SECOND DIVISION
|
ERNESTINA L. CRISOLOGO-JOSE, Petitioner, - versus - LAND BANK OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 167399
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: June 22, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Ernestina L. Crisologo-Jose seeks to set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 15, 2004[1] in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69463 and its
Resolution of January 24, 2005[2]
denying her motion for reconsideration.
Records yield
the following facts:
Petitioner is the owner of 34.6960
hectares of land which used to form part of a larger expanse situated in
Talavera, Nueva Ecija and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
NT-147218 of the land records of North Nueva Ecija. She is also the owner of
several parcels of land situated in the same municipality with a total area of
27.09 hectares and covered by twelve (12) separate titles, i.e., TCT Nos. 155604 -09, 155611, 155615, 245112-15. According to
the petitioner, respondent Land Bank of the P9,000.00 per hectare.
Excepting from the valuation purportedly
thus given, petitioner filed on P100,000.00 at least per hectare, or the total sum of P6,178,600.00
be fixed as just compensation of the total area of 61.7860 hectares,” it being her allegation that her computation
hewed with the guidelines established under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law[4] and other related statutes.
It appears that in the midst of petitioner’s
presentation of her evidence, the trial court admitted Land Bank’s ANSWER where, in gist, it alleged the
following:
1.
Of the 203.1060
hectares covered by TCT No. NT-147218, 168.31 hectares thereof was actually acquired
by DAR from Alejandro T. Lim pursuant to
Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, at P8,732.51
per hectare. The remaining 34.7960 hectares were left out from the coverage being
either a school site, a creek, a road or residential area.
2.
With respect to the other landholdings purportedly
situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, the claim folders thereof, if any, had not
been forwarded to the bank by the DAR.
On P100,000.00 per hectare. But beyond value determination, the trial court
ordered the respondent to pay petitioner the total sum of P6,178,600.00, subject
to the usual rules and regulation regarding payment.[5]
Following the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, respondent Land Bank went on appeal to the CA whereat its
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
69463.
Eventually, the CA, in a decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant appeal is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed decision dated
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the
original)
In time, petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the CA denied her motion in its equally assailed resolution
of
Hence, petitioner’s present recourse on
both procedural and substantive grounds.
The petition is without merit
On the procedural angle, petitioner
faults the appellate court for relying on and lending credence to the
allegations and defenses that respondent averred in its answer which it filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed
under Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court.[6] Petitioner also blames the trial court for
admitting, instead of expunging from the records, said answer and for not
declaring the respondent in default.
We are not persuaded.
To admit or to reject an answer filed
after the prescribed period is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[7] In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules authorizes
the court to accept answer though filed late, thus:
SECTION.
11. Extension of time to plead. –
Upon motion and on such terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to
plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms,
allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after the time fixed by these
Rules. (Emphasis added.)
And as Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission
on Higher Education[8]
teaches, an answer should be admitted where it had been filed before the
defendant was declared in default and no prejudice is caused to the plaintiff,
as here. Indeed, petitioner has not demonstrated how the admission by the trial
court of respondent’s answer was prejudicial to her case which, at bottom,
involves only the determination of the fair market value of her property.
Given Indiana Aerospace and other related cases cited therein virtually all of
which is one in saying that default orders should be avoided, petitioner’s
lament about the trial court not declaring the respondent in default for
alleged belated filing of answer should be denied cogency. What is more, a
declaration of default, if proper, shall not issue unless the claiming party
asked for it. As we said in Trajano vs. Cruz,[9]
applying what is now Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court[10] “the court cannot motu proprio declare a party in default.” In the words of Justice
Regalado “there must be a motion [for a
declaration of default] by the plaintiff with proof of failure by the defendant
to file his responsive pleading despite due notice.”[11]
Not lost on the
Court, of course, is the fact that petitioner, after securing the desired
ruling from the trial court, never brought up the matter of respondent’s
belated filing of an answer before the CA. Needless to belabor, issues not
raised below cannot, as a rule, be raised for the first time before the Court.
This brings us to
the issue of just compensation, a component in the implementation of the
agrarian reform program which partakes of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain.[12]
Just compensation, under the premises,
presupposes the expropriation or taking of agricultural lands for eventual
distribution to agrarian reform beneficiaries. In the case at bench, respondent
has averred and the CA has peremptorily determined that the tracts of land for
which petitioner is claiming just compensation have not actually been acquired
by the government.
With respect to the parcels of land with
a total area of 27.09 hectares and covered by TCT Nos. 155604, 155605, 155606,
155607, 155608, 155609, 155611 155615, 245112, 245113, 245114 and 245115, the
appellate court found that the claim folders therefor have not been forwarded
to the respondent bank for processing and eventual payment of the transfer
claims. This reality could only mean, so the CA correctly concludes, that the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not yet expropriated the parcels in question for
agrarian reform purposes. In other words, ownership or at least control over
the 27.09 hectares has not passed from the registered owner to the expropriator.
Petitioner could have had proven – but
had not - the fact of actual or symbolic
compulsory taking by presenting evidence
to that effect, such as the required Notice
of Valuation which usually follows the Notice
of Coverage, the letter of invitation to a preliminary conference and the Notice
of Acquisition that DAR sends, pursuant to DAR administrative issuances, to
the landowner affected.[13]
Just like the matter of the 27.09
hectares of land immediately referred to above, petitioner has not discharged
her burden of proving the acquisition by the DAR of the other 34.6960 hectares
of land once covered by TCT No. NT-147218. But even if perhaps she wanted to, she could
not have possibly done so, that portion being either a school site, a creek or
residential area, ergo unsuitable for
agricultural activities and, hence, outside the scope of the agrarian reform program, be it under the CARL law[14]
or the more exacting P.D. No. 27.[15] It must be stressed, at this juncture, that
respondent had all along – i.e., in
its basic answer, its CA appeal brief and finally in its Memorandum filed with
the Court - stuck to its position that the 27.09-hectare area was never taken over
by the DAR; and that no claim for compensation therefor was ever processed, as
is usual in agrarian compulsory acquisition scheme, under the summary
administrative proceedings prescribed by governing DAR circulars. Yet, the petitioner
never attempted to prove the contrary. Significantly, save for determining the
fair market value of the landholdings in question, no reference is also made in
the decision of the trial court regarding the actual expropriation of the
specific parcels of land subject of this case, albeit, quite strangely, it
ordered payment of the value of the property in question.
To reiterate, just compensation in
agrarian reform cases shall be paid for private agricultural lands taken under
the compulsory acquisition scheme for distribution to tenant-farmer
beneficiaries. Remove the element of compulsory taking and it is futile even to
dwell on the just compensation formula, let
alone ordering payment thereof. So it must be here.
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are accordingly AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A
T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan
Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
(ret.) and Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas; Rollo, pp. 59 et seq.
[2]
[3] Annex “A,” Petition;
[4] R.A.
No. 6657, as amended.
[5] Annex “C,” Petition; Rollo, pp. 34 et seq.
[6] Section 1. Answer to the complaint. – The defendant shall file his answer to
the complaint within fifteen (15) days
after service of summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
[8] G.R.
No. 139371,
[9] No. L-47070,
[10] If the defending party fails to
answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the
claiming party with notice to the defending party and proof of such failure,
declare the defending party in default. xxx.
[11] Regalado, supra,
citing Sarmiento vs. Juan, G.R. No. 56605,
[12] Association of
[13] Roxas
& Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876,
[14] Covers,
per Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6657, all public and private agricultural lands, i.e., land devoted to agricultural
activity, regardless of tenurial
arrangement; Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR, G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993, 225 SCRA
278.
[15] Covers only tenanted agricultural
lands planted to rice and/or corn.